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Using monthly return data over the period June 1994 – May 2001 we investigate the 
performance of randomly selected baskets of hedge funds ranging in size from 1 to 20 
funds. The analysis shows that increasing the number of funds can be expected to lead not 
only to a lower standard deviation but also, and less attractive, to lower skewness and 
increased correlation with the stock market. Most of the change occurs for relatively small 
portfolios. Holding more than 15 funds changes little. The population average appears to 
be a good approximation for the average basket of 15 or more funds. With 15 funds, 
however, there is still a substantial degree of variation in performance between baskets, 
which dissolves only slowly when the number of funds is increased. Survivorship bias is 
largely independent of portfolio size and thus cannot be diversified away. Finally, our 
efficiency test indicates that one only needs to combine a small number of funds to obtain a 
substantially more efficient risk-return profile than that offered by the average individual 
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Thanks to substantial marketing and media hype, hedge funds have recently become 
the favourites of many retail as well as institutional investors. Recently, two of the 
largest pension funds in the world, CalPERS and ABP, both announced plans to 
invest several billions of dollars in this asset class. The decision to include hedge 
funds in the asset allocation is typically based on a comparison of portfolios with and 
without hedge funds, where the hedge fund component is represented by a publicly 
available hedge fund index. Such an approach is not without dangers though. As 
shown in Brooks and Kat (2001), there can be considerable heterogeneity between 
indices that aim to reflect the same type of strategy as different indices tend to cover 
different parts of the hedge fund universe. In addition, some hedge fund indices 
contain more survivorship bias than others. As a result, investors’ perception of hedge 
fund performance and value-added heavily depends on the index studied. Another 
potential problem lies in the fact that investors will not actually invest in the hedge fund 
index that is used in the analysis but in a basket containing a much smaller number of 
funds. This is either done directly or, which appears to be the more popular approach 
nowadays, through a so-called fund of funds structure. Since the index is calculated over 
a much larger number of funds than contained in the basket, the index may not be a 
good proxy for the basket. If this misrepresentation is significant, this can have serious 
consequences for the outcome of the investment process, with the investor expecting 
one thing but ending up with something markedly different.  
 
In this paper we investigate how the performance of relatively small baskets of hedge 
funds deviates from that of the population. Using data over the period June 1994 – May 
2001, we study baskets of hedge funds that are randomly selected from a large sample 
of funds, explicitly accounting for fund closures. From the monthly returns on portfolios 
ranging in size from 1 to 20 funds we calculate six different sample statistics: the mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, correlation with the S&P 500, and the 
correlation with the Salomon Brothers Government Bond Index. In addition, we apply 
the dynamic trading based efficiency test developed earlier in Amin and Kat (2001a) to 
investigate how the risk-return efficiency of the latter portfolios changes as the number 
of funds increases.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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We are aware of two other studies of hedge fund diversification that follow a 
methodology similar to ours. Henker (1998) studied portfolios of hedge funds over 
the period 1992-1997. Peskin, et al. (2000) studied hedge fund portfolios over 1990-
2000. Both these studies are not without problems, however. Neither of them looks at 
skewness, kurtosis or at the correlation between hedge fund portfolio returns and 
equity and bond returns. In addition, Henker’s sample of funds is extremely small 
and his results are not free of survivorship bias.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the data we will use. In 
section  III we discuss the methodology followed and our main results. In section IV 
we turn to the matter of survivorship bias, while in section V we investigate the risk-
return efficiency of the portfolios studied. Section VI concludes.  
   
II. THE DATA 
The data in this study were obtained from Tremont TASS, which is one of the best 
known and largest hedge fund databases currently available. The database at our 
disposal contains monthly net of fee returns on a total of 2183 hedge funds and funds 
of funds from June 1994 up to and including May 2001. We had to eliminate 171 
funds due to incomplete and ambiguous data. We also eliminated the funds of funds 
from the sample. Per May 2001 this left us with 1195 live and 526 dead funds. As 
shown in Amin and Kat (2001b), concentrating on live funds only will on average 
overestimate the mean return on individual funds by around 2% as well as introduce 
a significant downward bias in estimates of the standard deviation. Not taking dead 
funds into account also causes an upward bias in the skewness and a downward bias 
in the kurtosis estimates of individual fund returns. To incorporate this in our analysis 
we decided not to work with the raw return series of the 264 funds that survived the 
period 1994-2001.  Instead, we created 455 7-year monthly return series by, starting 
off with the 455 funds that were alive in June 1994, replacing every fund that closed 
down during the sample period by a fund randomly selected from the set of funds 
following the same type of strategy and alive at the time of closure. For simplicity, 
we will still refer to the data series thus obtained as ‘fund returns’.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
 





Implicitly we assume that in case of fund closure investors are able to roll from one 
fund into the other at the reported end-of-month net asset values and at zero additional 
costs. This may underestimate the true costs of fund closure to the investor for two 
reasons. First, when a fund closes shop its investors will have to look for a 
replacement. This search takes time and is not without costs. Second, investors may 
get out of the old and into the new fund at values that are less favourable than the end-
of-month net asset values contained in the database. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
incorporate this into the analysis without further information.    
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
From the above 455 funds we created 500 different portfolios of equal size N, 
N=1,2,..,20, by random sampling without replacement. One could of course argue that 
investors will not select portfolios by random sampling. Although this is certainly true, 
this does not mean that in many cases random sampling is not a fair approximation of 
the actual fund selection process. So far, there is no reliable evidence that some 
investors (including fund of funds managers) are consistently able to select future out-
performers nor of the existence of specific patterns or anomalies. When corrected for 
possible biases, there is no significant persistence in hedge fund performance nor is 
there any significant difference in performance between older and younger funds, large 
and small funds, etc. In addition, older funds are often (more or less) closed for new 
investments. Investors that are relatively new to hedge fund investing are therefore often 
forced to invest in funds with little or no track record. If so, selecting funds based on 
(the statistical properties of) their track record is not an option. The fund prospectus and 
due diligence interviews with the manager may provide some information, but in most 
cases this information will only be sketchy at best.        
 
We calculated the monthly returns on every portfolio assuming equal weighting of all 
funds. From the monthly returns thus obtained we calculated the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness, kurtosis, correlation with the S&P 500, and the correlation with ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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the Salomon Brothers Government Bond Index. For portfolio sizes ranging from 1 to 
20, the 5
th, 10
th, etc. percentiles of the resulting frequency distributions are shown in 
figure 1-6. The horizontal line in every graph depicts the population value, i.e. the 
value of the relevant sample statistic for an equally-weighted portfolio containing all 
455 funds. 
 
<< Insert Figure 1  >> 
 
From figure 1 we see that, whatever the size of the portfolio, the frequency distribution 
of the sample means is symmetric and that the median is more or less equal to the 
population mean of 0.95%. Since every portfolio return is a linear combination of the 
returns on the component funds, the latter finding is of course not very surprising. The 
variation around the median is much higher for small portfolios than it is for larger 
portfolios. For individual funds the difference between the 75% and 25% percentile is 
86% of the median and the difference between the 90% and 10% percentile 179%. For 
portfolios containing 10 funds the 75-25% percentile difference is 36% and the 90-10% 
percentile difference is 68% of the median value. For larger portfolios the drop in the 
level of variation slows down significantly. For portfolios containing 20 funds for 
example the difference between the above percentiles is still equal to 24% and 46% of 
the median.    
 
<< Insert Figure 2 >> 
 
Figure 2 shows that the frequency distributions of the standard deviations are positively 
skewed. As the number of funds increases the median drops quickly towards the 
population value of 2.16%, but at a strongly decreasing rate. For individual funds the 
median is 4.83%. For portfolios of 5 funds it is 3.03%, for portfolios of 10 funds 2.74% 
and for portfolios of 20 funds the median is 2.44%. A similar result for common stock 
portfolios was first reported by Evans and Archer (1968). Whitmore (1970), 
however, has made it clear that the observed drop in portfolio standard deviation is a 
purely technical matter, i.e. it can be fully explained by the mathematics of portfolio ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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variance itself. Again, the variation around the median is much higher for small 
portfolios than for larger portfolios. For individual funds the difference between the 
75% and the 25% percentile is 202% of the median, while the difference between the 
90% and 10% percentile is 362%. For portfolios of 10 funds on the other hand these 
numbers are 45% and 86% respectively. For portfolios containing more than 10 funds 
the degree of variation drops much slower. For portfolios containing 20 funds the 
difference between the 75% and 25% percentile is 33% and between the 90% and 10% 
percentile is 61% of the median.  
 
<< Insert Figure 3  >>  
 
Figure 3 shows the frequency distributions of the observed skewness statistics. The 
graph has several interesting features. First, especially for smaller portfolios the 
frequency distributions are negatively skewed. Second, starting from a value of –0.12, 
the median skewness drops towards the population skewness of –0.59 when the number 
of funds in portfolio is increased. For portfolios of 10 funds the median skewness is       
–0.38 while for portfolios of 20 funds it is -0.48. A similar finding has been reported for 
common stock portfolios in Simkowitz and Beedles (1978). Contrary to what we saw 
before for the standard deviation, the observed drop in portfolio skewness is a truly 
empirical observation. It cannot simply be explained by the mathematics of portfolio 
skewness itself. Third, when the number of funds in portfolio increases the variation 
around the median declines but the drop is slower than for the mean and standard 
deviation. For individual funds the difference between the 90% and 10% percentile is 
533% of the median. For portfolios of 10 funds the difference is 300%, while for 
portfolios containing 20 funds it is 250%. The difference between the 75% and 25% 
percentile shows similar behaviour. For individual funds the difference between the 
75% and 25% percentile is 226% of the median. For portfolios of 10 and 20 funds these 
numbers are 142% and 119% respectively.  
 
<< Insert Figure 4  >> 
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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In figure 4 we see that the frequency distributions of the observed kurtosis statistics 
exhibit high positive skewness. Irrespective of the size of the portfolio, the median is 
more or less equal to the population kurtosis of 5.94. As with the previous statistics, the 
variation around the median declines as the number of funds increases. However, it does 
so in a very particular way. The higher percentiles grow much closer to the median 
when the number of funds increases, but the lower percentiles do not. The largest drop 
of the higher percentiles occurs for portfolios containing between 1 and 10 funds. After 
that there is little change. For individual funds the difference between the 75% and 25% 
percentile is 73% and the difference between the 90% and 10% percentile is 188% of 
the median. For portfolios containing 10 funds the 75-25% percentile difference is 51% 
and the 90-10% percentile difference is 93%. For portfolios containing 20 funds the 
difference between the above percentiles is 39% and 78% of the median, which is not 
too different from what we found for portfolios of 10 funds. 
 
<< Insert Figure 5 >> 
 
The frequency distributions of the correlation with the S&P 500 are depicted in figure 5. 
All distributions are negatively skewed, irrespective of the number of funds. Starting at 
a value of 0.34 for individual funds, the median rises quickly towards the population 
value of 0.67 when the portfolio size increases. With 10 funds in portfolio the median 
correlation is already up to 0.58, but with 20 funds it is only slightly higher at 0.62. The 
variation around the median declines with the number of funds in the usual way. For 
individual funds the difference between the 75% and the 25% percentile is 44% of the 
median, while the difference between the 90% and 10% percentile is 87%. For 
portfolios of 10 funds these numbers are 24% and 51% respectively. For portfolios 
containing more than 10 funds the degree of variation again drops slower, especially 
when measured from the medium percentiles. For portfolios containing 20 funds the 
difference between the 75% and 25% percentile is 17% and between the 90% and 10% 
percentile is 33% of the median.  
 
<< Insert Figure 6  >> ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
 




Finally, figure 6 shows the frequency distributions of the correlation with the Salomon 
Brothers Government Bond Index. Contrary to the correlations with the S&P 500, the 
frequency distributions are fairly symmetric. Starting from a value of –0.05, the median 
approaches the population value of –0.09 quite quickly. With 10 funds the median is –
0.07, while with 20 funds it is –0.08. Similar to what we found for skewness, the decline 
in variation around the median is slower than usual. For individual funds the difference 
between the 75% and 25% percentile is 186% of the median. For portfolios of 10 funds 
the difference is 124%, while for portfolios containing 20 funds it is still 98%. The 
difference between the 90% and 10% percentile shows similar behaviour. For individual 
funds the difference is 363% of the median. For portfolios of 10 and 20 funds these 
numbers are 223% and 179% respectively.  
 
In sum, figure 1-6 provide us with a number of interesting observations. First, for the 
mean and kurtosis the median value tends to be more or less equal to the population 
value, irrespective of the size of the portfolio. For the other statistics the median value 
quickly approaches the population value as the number of funds in the portfolio is 
increased. Adding more funds will tend to decrease the standard deviation and 
skewness of the portfolio return, while at the same time raising its correlation with the 
stock market. Second, although for all sample statistics the variation around the median 
declines substantially when the number of funds increases, the process is slower for 
skewness and the correlation with bonds than it is for the mean, standard deviation, 
kurtosis and correlation with the S&P 500. For larger portfolios the decline slows down 
considerably when the number of funds increases. Third, only the frequency 
distributions of the mean and the correlation with bonds are symmetric. The distributions 
of the standard deviation and kurtosis are positively skewed, while the distributions of 
skewness and the correlation with the S&P 500 are negatively skewed.  In other words, 
when randomly selecting a portfolio of hedge funds there is an increased probability of 
finding a relatively high standard deviation and kurtosis, low skewness and low 
correlation with the S&P 500. 
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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When deciding whether or not to invest in hedge funds many investors use one of the 
available hedge fund indices to determine whether the addition of hedge funds to their 
portfolio will improve its risk-return characteristics. These indices are typically 
calculated as simple equally-weighted population averages. In the above we have seen 
that the population average is a good approximation for the average basket of 15 or 
more hedge funds. The emphasis is on ‘average’, however. Figure 1-6 clearly show 
that with 15 funds there is still a substantial degree of variation in performance 
between baskets. In other words, despite the fact that the behaviour of the average 
basket of 15 or more funds can be expected to be similar to that of the population, the 
basket that the investor holds may behave significantly different. Increasing the 
number of funds in portfolio does not provide an easy answer to this problem as the 
remaining variation only dissolves slowly.  Obviously, investors should incorporate 
this uncertainty into their portfolio decision-making procedure. Doing so will 
effectively make hedge funds a riskier asset class, which may well lead to a reduction 
in many investors’ hedge fund allocations.
1   
 
<< Insert Table 1 and 2 >> 
 
When thinking about the observed variation in the various sample statistics, one is 
inclined to assume that the latter are uncorrelated. A priori, there is no reason why 
this should be the case, however. We therefore calculated the correlation coefficients 
between all six statistics for portfolios of 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20 funds. The results can 
be found in table 1. Although somewhat higher for larger portfolios, the correlation 
between most statistics does not appear to be very high. The most noteworthy 
exceptions are the correlations between (1) standard deviation and correlation with 
the S&P 500, (2) skewness and kurtosis, and (3) skewness and correlation with the 
S&P 500. One explanation for this is that different types of hedge fund strategies 
offer significantly different risk-return profiles.
2 As our portfolios are constructed by 
random sampling, we are likely to obtain a number of portfolios that are dominated 
by one or two particular strategies, especially when the portfolios are small. If these 
strategies have different statistical properties, with one strategy for example 
combining low skewness with high correlation with the S&P 500 and another 
strategy exhibiting the reverse, this will be reflected in the correlation coefficients ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
 
Copyright 2002 G. Amin and H.M. Kat 
 
9
that we calculated. Table 2 shows the average mean, standard deviation, skewness, 
kurtosis and correlation with the S&P 500 for funds following six different types of 
strategies. The table shows that there is quite some variation between the different 
strategies. The average long/short equity fund for example combines a relatively high 
mean and standard deviation with little skewness and a fair amount of correlation 
with the S&P 500. The profile of the average relative value fund on the other hand is 
completely opposite, combining a relatively low mean and standard deviation with 
high negative skewness and low correlation with the S&P 500.   
 
What do our results imply for the number of funds to hold? In figure 1-6 we have 
seen that increasing the number of funds will tend to reduce standard deviation, 
reduce skewness and increase the correlation with the stock market. There is a limit 
to this though, as it only takes about 15 funds for the median values to closely 
approach the population values. In addition, it only takes around 15 funds to very 
substantially reduce the variability around the median. Holding more than 15 funds 
changes little, i.e. the most relevant range of choice lies between 1 and 15 funds. Within 
this range it is difficult to make general recommendations without further details on 
investors’ utility functions.
3 If an investor’s highest priority was to avoid negative 
skewness and keep correlation with the equity market to a minimum, then he should 
invest in a single fund. This leaves a lot of uncertainty though. If an investor wanted 
more certainty, he should diversify. However, this means accepting a reduction in 
skewness and a rise in correlation with the stock market, which will severely limit the 
basket’s usefulness as a portfolio diversifier. Most investors nowadays seem to choose 
for the latter alternative and invest in a basket of hedge funds, either directly or through 
a fund of funds.  Apart from the strong reduction in uncertainty, a second reason to do 
so is the fact that, as shown in Amin and Kat (2001b), nowadays almost 15% of the 
funds alive at the beginning of the year close before the end of the year. When a fund 
closes, its investors will have to look for a replacement. This search is costly, takes 
time, and may lead to a fund that charges substantial entry fees and/or higher 
management and/or incentive fees than the old fund.  
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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Although the statistics calculated in this study are used for descriptive purposes only, in 
more formal terms they can also be interpreted as estimators for the corresponding 
distributional parameters. Taking the latter point of view, the observed variation around 
the median stems from two different sources. First, because many funds follow 
distinctly different strategies their returns can be expected to follow different 
distributions as well. Table 2 gives an indication of the differences between the main 
strategies. It should be noted, however, that there is also substantial variation within the 
various classes themselves. Second, as we only have 86 monthly returns to work with 
we are confronted with estimation error. Even if all funds had identically distributed 
returns we would expect to find variation in the parameter estimates. Because hedge 
fund return distributions vary substantially between funds and can be highly complex, it 
is difficult to formally distinguish between these two sources of variation. Due to 
diversification effects, however, parameter estimates for larger portfolios can be 
expected to contain less estimation error than estimates for small portfolios. 
 
IV. SURVIVORSHIP BIAS 
Hedge fund data vendors do not provide their subscribers with data on dead funds. As 
a result, investors are forced to use only surviving funds in their analysis. With dead 
funds explicitly incorporated in the above, we can easily obtain an estimate of the bias 
that is introduced by only looking at surviving funds by repeating the above analysis 
using only the 264 funds that survived the period 1994-2001 and then compare the 
results with those obtained earlier. The difference is the survivorship bias.
4 Table 3-8 








th percentile of the survivor portfolios and the portfolios 
containing live as well as dead funds used in the previous section. For brevity we 
concentrate on portfolios of 1-10 funds.   
 
<< Insert Table 3-8 >> 
 
From table 3 we see that excluding dead funds has a significant effect on the means. 
Irrespective of the size of the portfolio, all percentiles increase. Due to the exclusion of ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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dead funds the median mean return increases by 0.16% on average (or 1.92% per 
annum), which is in line with earlier estimates reported in the literature.
5 Table 4 shows 
that excluding dead funds leads to a significant reduction in the observed standard 
deviations. For very small portfolios the effect seems stronger than for larger portfolios, 
but not by much. On average the median monthly standard deviation drops by 0.24%.  
From table 5 we see that the exclusion of dead funds causes a rise in overall skewness 
and that the low percentiles rise a lot more than the high percentiles. The number of 
funds has little impact again. The results for kurtosis in table 6 are exactly opposite. 
Overall, the exclusion of dead funds causes kurtosis to drop, with the higher percentiles 
dropping a lot more than the lower percentiles. In addition, for small portfolios the 
effect is stronger than for larger portfolios. Finally, table 7 and 8 show that excluding 
dead funds has little impact on correlation. Both the correlation with the S&P 500 and 
the correlation with the bond index rise only slightly. In sum, there are two important 
conclusions to be drawn. First, survivorship bias is a serious problem in hedge fund 
data. Excluding dead funds will lead one to significantly overestimate mean and 
skewness and underestimate standard deviation and kurtosis. Second, survivorship bias 
is largely independent of portfolio size, meaning that the problem cannot be diversified 
away.  
 
V. THE EFFICIENCY TEST  
In Amin and Kat (2001a) we introduced a dynamic trading based efficiency test to 
investigate whether hedge funds offer investors value for money in terms of risk and 
return.
6 We found that the majority of individual funds do not offer a superior risk-
return profile. However, we also found that hedge fund indices offer a significantly 
better deal than the average individual hedge fund. To investigate how quickly 
efficiency improves when we move from individual funds to portfolios the most 
straightforward approach would be to apply the efficiency test to the portfolios 
studied in the previous sections. However, with only 86 data points available the 
efficiency test cannot be expected to be very accurate. We therefore revisited the 
Zurich Capital Market (previously MAR/Hedge) data used earlier in Amin and Kat 
(2001a). Starting with the 54 funds that were alive in May 1990, we repeated the 
portfolio construction procedure used before to produce 10 years of monthly portfolio ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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return data. Subsequently, we ran the efficiency test on the data thus obtained. The 
results are graphically depicted in figure 7. 
 
<< Insert Figure 7 >>      
    
From figure 7 we see that the frequency distributions of the efficiency test results are 
negatively skewed. Starting at –5.33% (which due to the negative skewness is 
slightly higher than the average of –5.95% reported in Amin and Kat (2001a)) the 
median improves quickly when the number of funds increases. With 5 funds in 
portfolio the median is already up to -1.06%, while with 20 funds it is only –0.31%. 
The variation around the mean shows a strong decline when the number of funds is 
increased. For individual funds the difference between the 75% and 25% percentile is 
6.17% and the difference between the 90% and 10% percentile is 11.79%. For 
portfolios containing 5 funds on the other hand the 75-25% percentile difference is 
2.28% and the 90-10% percentile difference is 5.13%. For larger portfolios the drop in 
the level of variation slows down. For portfolios containing 10 funds the difference 
between the above percentiles is 1.78% and 3.18%. These results clearly indicate that it 
only takes a small number of funds to obtain a substantially more efficient risk-return 
profile, which is particularly good news for smaller investors.  
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
 




Using monthly return data over the period June 1994 – May 2001, we investigated how 
the performance of relatively small randomly selected baskets of hedge funds deviates 
from that of the population. We also looked at survivorship bias and the efficiency of 
the risk-return profile offered. Our main conclusions are as follows: 
 
1. Expected diversification effects. Increasing the number of funds in portfolio 
can be expected to lead not only to a lower standard deviation but also, and less 
welcome, to lower skewness and higher correlation with equity. Most of the 
change occurs for relatively small portfolios. One can expect to closely approach 
the population values with just 15 funds. Mean, kurtosis and correlation with 
bonds tend to be largely unaffected by a change in the number of funds. 
  
2. Variation in performance. Individual hedge funds show extremely high 
variation in performance. When combined into portfolios the degree of variation 
drops strongly, although at a decreasing rate. For portfolios containing more 
than 15 funds the further decline in variation is only small.     
 
3. The optimal number of funds to hold. A relatively high number of funds will 
reduce uncertainty but will at the same time decrease skewness and raise the 
correlation with equity. The relevant range of choice lies between 1 and 15 
funds. Unless one holds a lot more, investing in more than 15 funds changes 
little. 
 
4. The index as proxy for a basket. The population average is a good 
approximation for the average basket of 15 or more funds. With 15 funds, 
however, the investor is still confronted with a substantial degree of variation 
in performance between baskets. Investors should take this into account when 
making their asset allocation decisions.  
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
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5. Survivorship bias. Survivorship bias is largely independent of portfolio size, 
i.e. it cannot be diversified away. Excluding dead funds will lead one to 
significantly overestimate the mean and skewness and underestimate the 
standard deviation and kurtosis of portfolio returns. 
 
6. Risk-return efficiency. From a risk-return perspective, individual hedge funds 
tend to be highly inefficient investment vehicles. However, one only needs to 
combine a small number of funds to obtain a substantially more efficient risk-
return profile than offered by the average individual hedge fund.  
 
The above is based on analysis of the monthly returns of randomly selected equally-
weighted portfolios. It would be interesting to see whether and by how much these 
conclusions would change if we would drop one or more of these assumptions. 
Instead of monthly, we could look at quarterly or semi-annual returns for example. 
Apart from a lack of sufficient data, a priori there is little reason to expect this to 
yield significantly different results, however. Using value- instead of equally-
weighted portfolios might have a bigger impact as this could create significant 
imbalances in portfolio weights. The most interesting variation is probably to repeat 
the analysis using stratified sampling, which would allow us to impose certain 
conditions on the composition of our portfolios with respect to the strategies, age, 
size, etc. of the component funds. We will save this for later though.  
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1. This is similar to the incorporation of parameter estimation risk. See for example 
Barry (1974) or Klein and Bawa (1976).   
 
2. Around 40% of the funds in our sample are long/short equity funds, 10% are 
emerging market funds, 10% are global macro funds, 15% follow event driven 
strategies, and 15% invest on relative value. 
 
3. Scott and Horvath (1980) show that under fairly weak assumptions concerning 
investors’ utility functions, investors will typically desire high odd moments and 
low even moments, i.e. like mean and skewness but dislike standard deviation 
and kurtosis. 
 
4. Recall that these estimates are based on the assumption that investors can swap 
funds at the reported net asset values without any additional costs. 
 
5. See for example Amin and Kat (2001b), Fung and Hsieh (2000) or Brown, 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999). 
 
6. We will not go into the details of the procedure here. These can be found in the 
original paper. 
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Correlation between    N=1  N=5   N=10   N=15    N=20 
Mean – Standard Deviation  0.14  0.26  0.31  0.23  0.31 
Mean – Skewness  0.21  0.22  0.25  0.15  0.20 
Mean – Kurtosis  -0.04  -0.03  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Mean - Corr S&P  0.16  0.22  0.13  0.18  0.17 
Mean - Corr Bonds  0.21  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.17 
Standard Dev - Skewness  0.19  0.03  0.01  0.02  -0.06 
Standard Dev - Kurtosis  0.01  0.15  0.14  0.08  0.11 
Standard Dev – Corr S&P  0.14  0.30  0.40  0.43  0.41 
Standard Dev – Corr Bonds  0.10  -0.10  0.07  0.13  0.12 
Skewness – Kurtosis  -0.35  -0.34  -0.40  -0.60  -0.65 
Skewness – Corr S&P  -0.18  -0.30  -0.40  -0.41  -0.48 
Skewness – Corr Bonds  0.26  0.13  0.13  0.18  0.14 
Kurtosis – Corr S&P  -0.02  0.08  0.08  0.16  0.18 
Kurtosis – Corr Bonds  -0.16  -0.16  -0.19  -0.23  -0.26 
Corr S&P – Corr Bonds  0.13  0.15  0.27  0.27  0.36 
Strategy  Mean  Standard Dev.   Skewness  Kurtosis   Corr S&P 
Long/Short Equity  1.24  5.65  -0.01  5.36  0.34 
Emerging Markets  0.24  7.62  -0.76  7.86  0.42 
Global Macro  0.77  5.03  0.77  6.82  0.13 
Relative Value  0.69  2.31  -0.72  6.85  0.10 
Event Driven  1.04  2.29  -0.75  8.03  0.32 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-07 
 
Copyright 2002 G. Amin and H.M. Kat 
 
19
Table 3: Survivorship Bias Mean Return 
 
N    5%  10%   25%   50%     75%   90%  95% 
1  0.18  0.26  0.18  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.08 
2  0.31  0.27  0.21  0.14  0.14  0.12  0.12 
3  0.30  0.20  0.18  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.22 
4  0.18  0.21  0.16  0.13  0.12  0.14  0.18 
5  0.18  0.22  0.19  0.17  0.15  0.11  0.04 
6  0.13  0.16  0.19  0.18  0.16  0.13  0.14 
7  0.15  0.18  0.16  0.14  0.12  0.11  0.09 
8  0.17  0.20  0.21  0.18  0.17  0.16  0.10 
9  0.18  0.19  0.17  0.16  0.16  0.14  0.12 






Table 4: Survivorship Bias Standard Deviation 
 
N    5%  10%   25%   50%     75%   90%  95% 
1  -0.13  -0.17  -0.63  -0.60  -0.42  -0.58  -2.10 
2  -0.46  -0.65  -0.43  -0.23  -0.15  0.05  -0.03 
3  -0.45  -0.41  -0.38  -0.43  -0.45  -0.40  -0.33 
4  -0.21  -0.14  -0.11  -0.18  -0.10  -0.10  -0.17 
5  -0.10  -0.11  -0.22  -0.21  -0.26  -0.26  -0.35 
6  -0.11  -0.12  -0.05  -0.12  -0.07  -0.19  -0.16 
7  -0.17  -0.13  -0.17  -0.03  -0.02  -0.07  -0.08 
8  -0.21  -0.13  -0.14  -0.20  -0.10  -0.22  -0.22 
9  -0.17  -0.19  -0.11  -0.13  -0.01  -0.22  -0.39 
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Table 5: Survivorship Bias Skewness 
 
N    5%  10%   25%   50%     75%   90%  95% 
1  0.94  0.60  0.24  0.06  -0.03  -0.03  0.26 
2  0.67  0.30  0.01  -0.05  0.01  -0.08  0.02 
3  0.33  0.11  0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -0.01  0.08 
4  0.70  0.56  0.21  0.08  0.06  0.14  0.08 
5  0.21  0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.04  0.00  0.07 
6  0.58  0.32  0.16  0.05  0.03  -0.15  -0.17 
7  0.24  0.22  0.07  0.08  0.02  -0.01  0.01 
8  0.26  0.19  0.08  0.03  0.05  0.11  0.20 
9  0.21  0.17  0.07  0.09  0.15  0.09  0.19 





Table 6: Survivorship Bias Kurtosis 
 
N    5%  10%   25%   50%     75%   90%  95% 
1  -0.09  -0.19  -0.26  -0.51  -1.55  -2.25  -3.44 
2  -0.04  0.03  -0.11  -0.15  -0.90  -3.47  -3.14 
3  -0.03  -0.04  -0.16  -0.19  -1.05  -0.93  -2.23 
4  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.44  -1.31  -3.03  -3.70 
5  0.09  0.12  -0.07  -0.22  -0.49  -1.04  -1.82 
6  0.05  -0.06  -0.08  -0.10  -0.92  -2.00  -2.99 
7  0.02  -0.09  -0.18  -0.18  -0.70  -1.10  -1.27 
8  -0.10  -0.13  -0.27  -0.45  -0.55  -1.46  -1.67 
9  -0.12  -0.21  -0.08  -0.41  -0.58  -1.31  -1.57 
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Table 7: Survivorship Bias Correlation S&P 500 
 
N    5%  10%   25%   50%     75%   90%  95% 
1  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.04 
2  0.09  0.09  0.05  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.10 
3  0.04  0.10  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.07 
4  0.09  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04 
5  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.07  0.06 
6  0.01  0.05  0.08  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.04 
7  -0.04  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.05 
8  -0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.04 
9  -0.01  -0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.05 





Table 8: Survivorship Bias Correlation Salomon Brothers Bond Index 
 
N    5%  10%   25%   50%     75%   90%  95% 
1  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 
2  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.03 
3  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03 
4  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
5  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
6  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
7  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
8  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01 
9  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
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Figure 6: Frequency Distributions of Sample Correlation with the Salomon Brothers Bond Index 
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